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Abstract	
	
	Founded	in	ancient	times,	the	twin	Spanish	cities	of	Ceuta	and	Melilla	combined	comprise	just	11.8	square	miles	and	have	fewer	than	200,000	inhabitants.	Despite	their	rather	insignificant	sizes,	they	are	important	because	they	serve	as	the	only	land	borders	between	the	European	Union	and	the	African	continent,	generating	a	host	of	complicated	questions.	This	research	explores	the	role	of	smuggling	as	a	form	of	micro-economy	and	identity.	Through	interviews	of	Moroccans	with	ties	to	smuggling	as	well	as	interviews	with	residents	of	Ceuta,	this	case	study	begins	to	examine	the	role	smuggling	plays	in	the	debates	about	the	sovereignty	of	the	two	cities,	among	other	issues.			
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Introduction			 Comprising	just	over	30	square	kilometers	combined,	the	twin	Spanish	cities	of	Ceuta	and	Melilla	mark	two	of	the	most	interesting	and	unique	political	boundaries	on	the	planet.	The	two	tiny	Spanish	enclaves	in	North	Africa,	each	with	populations	of	around	85,000	inhabitants,	are	encompassed	by	Moroccan	territory,	but	open	to	the	world	via	their	ocean	ports.		
	Pictured:	Ceuta	as	seen	from	Monte	Hacho.	
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	Pictured:	The	Port	of	Melilla.		Historically,	the	cities	have	long	been	of	great	importance	to	regional	trade,	beginning	as	early	as	the	5th	century	BCE	with	the	Carthaginians.	The	territory	of	Ceuta	changed	hands	several	times	in	the	intervening	two	and	a	half	millennia,	significantly	falling	to	the	Portuguese	in	1415	after	the	Battle	of	Ceuta	and	ultimately	to	Spain	in	1688	following	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	(Britannica,	2009).	The	city	has	been	subject	to	Spanish	sovereignty	ever	since,	though	this	continues	to	be	contested,	since	the	Moroccan	government	refuses	to	accept	Spanish	hegemony.	Melilla,	too,	has	a	complicated	history.	Originally	colonized	by	the	Phoenicians	and	later	the	Romans,	Melilla	fell	to	Spanish	rule	in	1497.	After	acquiring	the	nearby	territory	in	1909,	Spain	modernized	Melilla’s	port	and	turned	the	city	into	a	military	garrison	to	support	Spanish	Morocco.	12	years	later,	in	1921,	the	Rif	War	(sometimes	known	as	the	Melilla	War)	broke	out	between	Spain	and	Berber	tribes	led	by	Abd	el-Krim,	which	almost	managed	to	claim	the	city.	In	1995,	Spain	approved	statutes	of	autonomy	for	Ceuta	and	Melilla,	granting	the	cities	status	more	akin	to	Spain’s	
	 9	
other	autonomous	communities	(Britannica,	2010).	To	this	day,	Madrid	still	contends	that	Ceuta,	Melilla,	and	the	other	plazas	de	soberanía	(literally	places	of	sovereignty),	are	an	“integral	part	of	Spanish	territory”	(Howe,	2005,	p.	314).		 Despite	the	international	recognition	of	Spanish	rule	over	the	cities,	it	was	clear	from	my	visits	to	Ceuta	and	Melilla	that	the	cities	are	still	of	great	importance	to	Morocco.	At	each	of	my	border	crossings,	as	I	waited	in	the	queue	to	enter	and	exit	the	country	through	the	heavily	guarded	and	fortified	borders,	I	was	struck	by	the	number	of	Moroccans	bringing	enormous	bags	of	goods	back	from	the	European	colonies.	At	certain	times	of	day,	it	seems	there	is	a	near	constant	flow	of	Moroccans	carrying	back	goods	to	their	home	country.	It	was	this	observation	that	led	me	to	my	research	questions.			 As	contested	colonial	holdings,	it	seems	obvious	that	Moroccans	would	side	with	their	government	in	its	demands	for	sovereignty	over	Ceuta,	Melilla	and	the	other	populated	Spanish	territories,	composed	mostly	of	small	islands	lining	the	Moroccan	coast.	For	most	groups,	this	is	probably	true,	yet	there	are	some	Moroccans	who	have	much	to	gain	from	having	a	convenient	piece	of	Spain	on	the	African	continent.	I	sought	to	understand	the	mentality	of	the	select	group	of	Moroccans	who	are	perhaps	most	familiar	with	Ceuta	and	Melilla:	the	traders	who	enter	regularly	to	bring	back	foreign	goods	to	re-sell	in	Morocco.	How	do	Moroccan	smugglers	feel	about	the	issue	of	Ceuta	and	Melilla’s	sovereignty?	Do	they	agree	with	their	government	despite	the	fact	that	their	economic	livelihoods	depend	on	the	cities’	colonial	statuses?	How	are	trade	issues	related	to	issues	of	identity?	Why	is	this	trade	necessary?	How	is	it	organized?	Are	traders	bringing	goods	that	can’t	be	acquired	in	Morocco	easily?	What	kinds	of	things	are	they	buying?	What,	if	any,	status	is	achieved	by	Moroccans	who	later	buy	these	Western	goods?	
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Literature	Review	
Preface		 One	of	the	greatest	challenges	in	undertaking	this	research	was	the	apparent	dearth	of	recent	scholarship,	especially	scholarship	readily	accessible	in	English.	This	review	examines	the	existing	literature	and	attempts	to	place	the	work	of	others	into	several	broad	categories.	Specifically,	this	review	will	examine	the	history	of	the	border	disputes	between	the	kingdoms	of	Morocco	and	Spain,	review	the	complicated	histories	of	Ceuta	and	Melilla,	examine	literature	about	smuggling	between	the	two	autonomous	cities	and	Morocco,	as	well	as	examine	other	issues	related	to	the	land	borders	between	the	two	countries.	It	is	important	to	review	and	understand	the	historical	context	and	intricacies	of	the	border	dynamics	before	exploring	and	examining	the	data	gathered	in	the	present	study.		
History	of	the	Border	Disputes	and	Evaluating	Claims		 At	present,	Spain	controls	a	number	of	small	territories	in	North	Africa,	as	well	as	the	notable	cities	of	Ceuta	and	Melilla.	Ceuta	and	Melilla	are	considered	to	be	the	two	major	territories,	while	the	Islas	Alhucemas,	Islas	Chafarinas,	and	Peñón	de	Vélez	de	la	Gomera	constitute	the	minor	holdings,	containing	military	garrisons	but	no	stable	civilian	population.	One	might	also	add	the	islet	of	Perejil	to	this	list,	which	at	present	is	unoccupied	but	has	been	another	source	of	contention	between	Spain	and	Morocco.			 Since	Morocco	achieved	independence	in	1956,	the	country	has	laid	claim	to	all	of	what	it	perceives	to	be	Spain’s	lingering	colonial	holdings.	Moroccan	claims	to	Ceuta	and	Melilla	have	found	little	support	from	the	international	community,	first	discussing	the	matter	in	the	UN	on	October	7,	1960,	though	they	did	not	ask	to	have	the	cities	included	on	the	General	Assembly’s	list	of	non-self-governing	territories	(Trinidad,	2012,	p.	965).	It	was	
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not	until	January	1975	that	Morocco	formally	asked	the	UN	Decolonization	Committee	to	include	the	so-called	colonial	enclaves	on	their	list	of	non-self-governing	territories,	which	was	interpreted	by	the	Spanish	government	as	“a	threat	to	Spain’s	national	unity	and	territorial	integrity”	(Wiegand,	2011,	p.	187).	That	summer,	in	June,	Spanish	and	Moroccan	troops	met	at	the	borders	of	the	enclaves,	following	a	series	of	bombings	in	Ceuta	and	Melilla,	with	400	Moroccans	arrested	as	suspects.	Tensions	would	further	escalate	in	November	of	that	year	when	King	Hassan	issued	a	bold	threat	to	Spain’s	new	king,	Juan	Carlos,	stating	that	if	Spain	were	to	acquire	Gibraltar	from	the	British,	Morocco	would	have	to	claim	Ceuta	and	Melilla,	stating	that	“no	power	can	permit	Spain	to	possess	both	keys	to	the	same	straits”	(ibid).	Tensions	would	not	die	down	in	the	ensuing	years,	as	a	group	known	as	the	Moroccan	Patriotic	Front	bombed	locations	in	the	two	cities	in	1978	and	1979.			 Other	than	these	occasional	outbursts	of	violence	by	private	citizens,	the	conflict	between	the	two	countries	has	remained	largely	quiet	and	diplomatic	in	recent	decades,	with	one	exception.	In	July	2002,	members	of	the	Moroccan	armed	forces	occupied	the	islet	of	Perejil,	and	raised	a	Moroccan	flag	over	the	small	island.	Officially,	the	move	was	part	of	an	effort	to	combat	terrorism	and	illegal	immigration,	though	the	Spanish	were	quick	to	condemn	this	action.	Feeling	threatened,	Madrid	deployed	naval	units,	special	ground	forces,	as	well	as	combat	aircraft	to	defend	what	German	political	scientist	Daniel-Erasmus	Khan	describes	as	a	“virtually	worthless	piece	of	rock”	(Trinidad,	2012	p.	964;	BBC,	2002).	Ultimately,	six	Moroccans	were	taken	prisoner	and	brought	to	Ceuta	before	they	were	repatriated	hours	later.	Spain	also	replaced	the	Moroccan	flag	on	the	island	with	two	Spanish	flags.	Why	spark	an	international	incident	over	such	a	small	and	insignificant	piece	
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of	land?	It	seems	likely	that	the	then-recently	crowned	king	of	Morocco,	Mohammad	VI,	was	eager	to	test	Madrid’s	resolve,	as	well	as	to	gauge	the	international	reaction	and	perhaps	renew	the	conversation	about	Morocco’s	sovereignty	claims	(Trinidad,	2012,	p.	964).	Indeed,	talking	about	the	incident,	former	Spanish	Prime	Minister	José	María	Aznar	remarked	“los	marroquíes	han	hecho	algo	illegal.	Es	cierto	que	para	nosotros	Perejil	tiene	un	
valor	simbólico.	Lo	tiene	para	ellos	y	para	nosotros.	Pero	si	nosotros	no	reaccionamos,	será	
interpretado	como	debilidad,	y	no	sabemos	cuál	es	el	paso	siguiente	que	darán”	(Iglesias,	2010,	p.	404).	(The	Moroccans	have	done	something	illegal.	It	is	true	that	for	us	Perejil	has	a	symbolic	value.	It	has	symbolic	value	for	them	and	for	us.	But	if	we	did	not	react,	it	will	be	interpreted	as	weakness,	and	we	don’t	know	what	their	next	step	would	be.)		 Despite	all	of	the	political	rhetoric	and	rising	tensions,	it	seems	unlikely	for	the	time	being	that	Morocco	will	be	able	to	annex	any	of	the	populated	territories	peacefully	(though	it	should	be	noted	that	Spain	considered	ceding	control	of	Melilla	to	Morocco	on	and	relinquishing	Ceuta	as	an	international	zone	in	1979)	(Europa	Press,	2017).	With	the	implicit	support	of	the	international	community,	Spain	negotiates	from	a	position	of	power.	The	most	difficult	element	in	resolving	the	dispute	over	the	enclaves,	notes	Trinidad,	is	the	human	aspect	(Trinidad,	2012,	p.	974).	It	is	perhaps	quixotic	for	Morocco	to	believe	that	it	could	claim	Ceuta	and	Melilla	any	time	soon,	though	there	may	be	hope	for	some	of	the	smaller	Spanish	territories.	There	is	less	emotional	attachment	to	these	places,	and	the	Spanish	government	considered	abandoning	Vélez	as	early	as	1871.	Tabling	claims	to	the	major	territories	and	focusing	on	the	smaller	ones	may	be	the	most	effective	strategy	for	Moroccan	irredentism	(Trinidad,	2012,	p.	975).			
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A	Brief	History	of	Ceuta		 As	previously	stated,	the	rich	and	complex	history	of	Ceuta	dates	back	to	ancient	times,	with	some	sources	suggesting	the	area	was	inhabited	as	early	as	the	5th	century	BCE.	As	the	early	Muslim	conquests	spread	west,	Arabs	first	arrived	on	the	scene	in	present	day	Ceuta	in	the	8th	century	CE.	Sebta,	as	the	city	is	known	in	Arabic,	maintained	a	strong	Arab	presence	from	then	on,	with	the	city	flourishing	as	a	critical	Mediterranean	port	city	under	a	series	of	caliphates	and	emirates	(Gold,	2000,	p.	xi).	Culturally,	the	city	also	prospered	under	Muslim	domination,	and	by	the	15th	century,	the	city	contained	over	one	thousand	mosques,	62	libraries,	43	educational	institutes,	and	a	university	(O’Reilly,	1994,	p.	2).		Across	the	strait	of	Gibraltar,	however,	Muslim	domination	faltered.	The	Reconquista	efforts	led	by	the	Catholic	monarchs	Isabella	I	and	Fernando	II	successfully	removed	the	last	political	vestige	of	Moorish	Spain	in	1492	with	the	capture	of	the	city	of	Grenada.		Shortly	before	the	conclusion	of	the	Reconquista,	Juan	I,	King	of	Portugal,	crossed	the	Strait	of	Gibraltar	and	claimed	Ceuta	by	force	in	1415	(O’Reilly,	1994,	p.	2).	In	1580,	the	two	Iberian	crowns	united,	and	upon	their	dissolution	in	1640,	Ceuta	opted	to	remain	under	Spanish	rule.	From	this	point	on,	the	city	would	remain	under	Spanish	dominion,	though	the	city’s	flag	to	this	day	recognizes	its	Portuguese	heritage,	featuring	the	same	background	as	the	flag	of	Lisbon,	and	contains	the	shield	configuration	of	Portugal.	Though	the	city	has	never	since	changed	hands,	it	has	been	subject	to	attack	from	Muslim	forces,	with	notable	sieges	in	1728,	1732,	and	1771	(ibid).		 Even	though	the	city	has	never	been	a	particularly	important	population	center,	it	has	served	several	important	roles	in	Spanish	history.	When	it	was	initially	claimed,	Ceuta,	along	with	other	plazas,	served	as	a	first	line	of	defense	against	Muslim	incursions	into	the	
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Iberian	Peninsula,	supported	the	crusade	efforts	(with	the	plazas	offering	shelter	to	Christian	shippers),	and	enhanced	Spain’s	status	as	a	powerful	force	in	the	Mediterranean,	with	military	garrisons	to	help	stage	important	colonial	wars.	Additionally,	Ceuta	served	as	penal	colony	in	the	17th	and	18th	centuries	before	becoming	an	economic	hub	as	a	free	port	city	in	the	19th	century.		 In	more	recent	years,	Spain	enhanced	its	claim	to	Ceuta	and	Melilla	as	a	result	of	the	country’s	European	integration.	In	1986,	just	over	a	decade	after	the	end	of	the	Franco	regime,	Spain	officially	ascended	to	the	European	Union,	which	automatically	made	the	two	enclaves	part	of	the	EU,	as	well.	Five	years	later,	in	1991,	Spain’s	borders	in	Ceuta	and	Melilla	were	“Schengenized,”	a	process	whose	importance	will	become	apparent	later	in	this	review	(Ferrer-Gallardo,	2008,	p.	305).	Lastly,	as	part	of	Spain’s	integration	into	Europe,	the	country	began	the	process	of	enhancing	border	security	in	1995.	This	was	in	line	with	the	immigration	policies	of	other	new-immigration	countries	in	Southern	Europe,	who	have	shown	their	willingness	to	be	‘good	citizens’	of	the	continent	by	raising	border	defenses.	This	should	be	taken	with	a	grain	of	salt,	notes	Marenin,	as	the	visibility	of	the	Spanish	border	fence	presents	a	façade	of	control	yet	in	reality	only	serves	to	redirect	the	flow	of	migration	(Marenin,	2006,	p.	70).		
A	Brief	History	of	Melilla		 Like	its	twin,	the	territory	now	referred	to	as	Melilla	has	a	rich	history	dating	back	to	ancient	times.	Between	the	10th	and	13th	centuries,	the	city	prospered	as	a	fortified	trade	stop	between	Muslim	Spain,	North	Italian	city-states,	as	well	as	trans-Saharan	traffic	from	Timbuktu	(Driessen,	1991,	p.	8).	The	city	started	to	decay	in	the	late	1300’s,	due	to	dynastic	
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struggles	between	the	sultanates	of	Fez	and	Tlemcen,	and	by	the	time	the	Spanish	arrived,	the	city	was	already	abandoned	and	partly	ruined	(Driessen,	1991,	p.	9).			 In	1497,	Spanish	forces	led	by	Pedro	de	Estopiñán	took	the	ailing	city	with	relative	ease,	beginning	a	period	of	uninterrupted	Spanish	control	that	persists	to	this	day.	In	1863,	Melilla	and	Ceuta	acquired	free-port	status,	partially	transforming	the	role	of	the	garrison	cities	(Ferrer-Gallardo,	2008,	p.	305).		After	decades	of	European	intervention	in	Moroccan	affairs,	the	French	established	a	protectorate	in	March	1912,	capitalizing	on	the	military	and	political	weakness	of	the	Moroccan	state.	Seeking	to	establish	a	buffer	between	the	newly	established	protectorate	and	the	British	military	stronghold	at	Gibraltar,	the	French	granted	Spain	their	own	protectorate,	with	a	“sublease”	of	some	7,700	square	miles	in	the	north	of	Morocco	at	the	tail	end	of	the	year.	This	connected	Spain’s	twin	enclaves	and	allowed	the	country	to	regain	a	taste	of	empire	after	their	devastating	defeat	in	the	Spanish-American	war	at	the	tail	end	of	the	19th	century.	
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	Pictured:	A	man	tends	to	his	flock	outside	of	the	crumbling	remains	of	a	Spanish	administrative	building	in	Zaio,	Morocco.		Melilla	would	serve	as	a	key	garrison	and	staging	point	in	Spain’s	ill-fated	attempt	to	control	their	newly	acquired	colony,	and	it	would	turn	disastrous	with	the	outbreak	of	the	Rif	War,	sometimes	known	as	the	War	of	Melilla.	United	Rif	peoples,	under	the	leadership	of	Muhammad	Abd	el-Krim,	rose	up	against	the	Spanish	in	a	bloody	war	that	lasted	from	1921-1926,	with	Abd	el-Krim’s	forces	almost	taking	Melilla	in	1921.	Notably,	the	city	was	also	the	first	to	rise	against	the	Popular	Front	government	of	Spain	in	the	summer	of	1936,	which	helped	precipitate	the	Spanish	Civil	War.	(Flemming,	2014;	Britannica	2010).	
Smuggling		 Though	Morocco	remains	adamant	that	Ceuta,	Melilla,	and	the	other	plazas	de	
soberanía	(places	of	sovereignty)	are	inherently	Moroccan,	a	huge	number	of	Moroccans	depend	upon	the	colonial	status	of	Ceuta	and	Melilla	for	their	livelihoods.	Indeed,	as	noted	by	Ferrer-Gallardo,	some	20,000	people	crossed	the	border	into	each	enclave	daily	in	2008	
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(Ferrer-Gallardo,	2008,	p.	311).	Despite	the	intense	security	measures	in	place,	(including	a	series	of	metal	fences	3.5-6	meters	high	equipped	with	thermal	and	infrared	cameras,	pepper	sprays,	as	well	as	barbed	wire)	some	Moroccans	are	easily	able	to	enter	the	cities	as	a	consequence	of	the	“Schengenization”	of	the	border.	The	Spanish	border	is	selectively	penetrable;	the	significant	security	apparatus	is	designed	to	deter	“undesirable”	entrants	such	as	sub-Saharan	Africans	seeking	passage	to	Europe,	but	allows	relatively	easy	and	open	access	to	the	permitted	and	“exceptionally	Schengenized”	Moroccans	bearing	passports	from	either	the	Tetouan	or	Nador	region	(Ferrer-Gallardo,	2008,	p.	310).			 Given	the	territories’	status	as	free	ports	with	special	tax	policies,	it	should	come	as	no	surprise	that	smuggling	thrives	in	the	north	of	Morocco.	In	1970,	economic	inequality	between	Spain	and	Morocco	was	moderate,	with	Spanish	GDP	per	capita	sitting	at	roughly	four	times	that	of	their	neighbor	to	the	south.	In	2004,	however,	Spain’s	GDP	per	capita	was	15	times	larger,	making	it	the	most	unequal	border	in	the	European	Union,	or	of	any	Organization	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development	(OECD)	member	state	(Moré,	2011,	p.	8).	Reliable	estimates	for	the	value	of	the	informal	economy	are	hard	to	come	by,	though	a	2002	study	by	the	Ceuta	Chamber	of	Commerce	placed	its	lowest	estimate	for	so-called	“border	trade”	at	600	million	Euros	annually.	Moré	suggests	that	a	reasonable	estimate	for	the	value	of	the	Ceuta-Melilla	smuggling	operation	hovers	around	1	billion	Euros	annually,	equal	to	half	of	the	value	of	all	declared	exports	from	Spain	to	Morocco	for	which	tariffs	are	paid	(Moré,	2011,	p.	41).		Additionally,	considering	Morocco’s	political	disagreements	with	Spain	over	the	sovereignty	of	the	cities,	there	is	little	impetus	for	the	developing	nation	to	try	to	rein	in	the	widespread	smuggling.	As	Gold	notes,	Morocco	has	little	interest	in	improving	the	security	
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of	the	borders	with	any	real	ardor,	as	this	would	tacitly	imply	to	Spain	and	the	rest	of	the	world	that	the	borders	with	Ceuta	and	Melilla	are	indeed	legitimate	(Gold,	2000,	p.	171).	Spain,	for	its	part,	also	does	not	wish	to	see	the	smuggling	curtailed.	Gold	also	notes	that	much	of	the	commercial	activity	in	the	twin	enclaves	is	dependent	upon	the	ease	with	which	duty-free	products	can	be	passed	across	the	border	with	Morocco	and	into	the	rest	of	the	African	continent.	Without	this,	Gold	postulates,	Spain	would	be	forced	to	take	on	the	cumbersome	task	of	subsidizing	the	economic	livelihood	of	the	enclaves	(ibid).		 Citing	the	work	of	Hajjaji,	Ferrer-Gallardo	identifies	three	different	kinds	of	smugglers	that	work	between	Morocco	and	Spain.	Among	them	are	the	more	casual,	occasional	smugglers	who	bring	back	tobacco,	alcohol,	or	electrical	appliances	(a	group	consisting	mostly	of	foreign	workers,	students,	civil	servants,	and	generally	any	Spaniard	or	Moroccan	who	can	easily	enter	and	exit	the	enclaves);	regular	day-to-day	subsistence	smugglers	who	bring	a	constant	flow	of	consumption	goods	(at	the	time	of	his	research	performed	several	times	daily	by	inhabitants	of	Moroccan	border	towns);	and	lastly	large-scale	smugglers	who	bring	big	electronic	equipment	such	as	satellite	dishes	and	other	expensive	goods,	performed	by	an	organized	network	of	professional	smugglers	(Ferrer-Gallardo,	2008,	p.	312).			 It	is	unclear	exactly	what	the	effect	of	this	expansive	informal	trade	has	been	on	the	Moroccan	economy.	Though	it	is	clear	through	the	demographic	and	urban	expansion	of	Moroccan	border	towns	like	Nador	that	the	particular	border	dynamics	have	generated	seriously	lucrative	opportunity	in	a	region	of	the	country	especially	crippled	by	the	poor	economy,	this	growth	is	not	without	its	detriments	to	the	national	financial	systems.	It	is	impossible	for	Moroccan	manufacturing	to	compete	with	the	prices	generated	by	the	free	
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ports	of	Ceuta	and	Melilla.	With	Spanish	smuggled	goods	making	it	at	least	as	far	as	south	as	Casablanca,	the	trade	deeply	affects	many	aspects	of	Morocco’s	national	economy.	Indeed,	as	noted	by	Mateos,	at	least	two	factories	that	produced	televisions	in	Casablanca	have	ceased	production	due	to	their	illegal	competitors	(Mateos,	2005,	p.	249).			 Lastly,	it	is	important	to	review	how	it	is	that	Morocco’s	massive	smuggling	industry	operates	above	the	law.	According	to	Mateos,	getting	past	customs	with	goods	involves	first	establishing	specific	police	contacts	to	facilitate	the	process.	Once	contacts	have	been	established,	smugglers	pay	bribes	to	police	officers,	as	well	as	offer	them	“gifts,”	which	include	various	household	items.	The	gifts	can	vary	to	a	great	degree,	with	smugglers	who	bring	in	more	expensive	items	often	having	monetary	commission	or	more	valuable	gifts	demanded	of	them	by	customs	officials	(Mateos,	2005,	p.	249-250).			 Mateos	also	notes	that,	rather	oddly,	male	smugglers	mostly	work	alone	whereas	female	smugglers	work	together.	Women	apparently	work	together	to	protect	themselves	from	the	police,	and	to	ensure	they	have	enough	money	to	pass	through	customs.	Working	together	has	its	benefits,	according	to	Mateos’	smuggler	contact,	as	he	believed	that	women	profit	more	than	men	by	using	their	feminine	charm	to	cut	better	deals	at	every	obstacle	(ibid).			 Bribery,	it	seems,	does	not	end	at	the	border.	Writing	about	his	experience	in	Nador,	scholar	David	A.	McMurray	observed	that	smugglers	often	sell	their	own	wares	to	retailers	or	hawk	their	products	on	the	street	in	regular	locations	so	that	their	clients	would	be	able	to	find	them.	Spending	so	much	time	in	the	public	eye	came	with	a	cost,	as	hawking	required	a	steep	bribe	to	the	mukhazni	(local	police	agents).	McMurray	estimates	that	these	bribes	could	cost	vendors	more	than	10	percent	of	their	take	(McMurray,	2001,	p.	110).	(It	
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should	be	noted	that	since	McMurray’s	estimates	were	made	more	than	a	decade	ago,	it	is	possible	that	traders	now	lose	even	higher	percentages	of	their	take	to	bribes).	
Other	Issues	of	Transnationalism		 As	one	might	suspect,	smuggling	is	far	from	the	only	problem	created	by	the	unequal	borders	between	Spain	and	Morocco.	Migration,	particularly	of	sub-Saharan	migrants	seeking	passage	to	Europe,	has	proven	to	be	a	major	challenge	to	manage,	despite	the	intense	security	measures	and	precautions	at	the	border	described	above.	Tensions	rise	and	fall,	though	perhaps	the	worst	incident	occurred	in	June	of	1996.	Following	the	election	of	a	conservative	government	led	by	José	María	Aznar,	Spain	committed	one	of	the	most	heinous	operations	in	the	country’s	modern	history	when	103	African	illegal	immigrants	living	in	Melilla	were	taken	across	the	Strait	to	Málaga,	where	they	were	drugged	and	placed	on	military	planes	before	being	deported	to	assorted	African	countries,	regardless	of	where	they	had	actually	come	from	(Carr,	1997,	p.	61).	Despite	intense	criticism	from	various	human	rights	organizations,	the	Spanish	government	was	largely	unrepentant	for	their	actions,	with	then-Interior	Minister	Jaime	Mayor	Oreja	describing	their	deportations	as	“disagreeable”	and	“unaesthetic.”	Aznar	more	coldly	declared,	“we	had	a	problem	and	we	solved	it”	(ibid).		 For	those	migrants	that	do	make	it	to	Ceuta	or	Melilla,	life	is	rarely	easy.	Many	of	the	migrants	who	reach	the	cities	have	traveled	thousands	of	miles	by	land,	but	without	proper	documentation	they	become	effectively	stateless	in	their	new	foreign	home.	Here	they	are	denied	permission	to	cross	to	the	mainland,	but	also	cannot	be	turned	back,	as	the	Moroccan	government	will	not	accept	responsibility	for	them,	citing	the	fact	that	there	is	no	official	evidence	proving	that	the	migrants	entered	the	cities	from	Morocco.	This	is	pretty	
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clearly	politically	motivated,	as	accepting	these	migrants	would	reflect	a	tacit	acceptance	of	Spanish	sovereignty	over	the	enclaves	(Carr,	1997,	p.	64-65).			 Unable	to	leave	or	to	work	in	the	cities,	many	migrants	survive	on	occasional	charity	provided	by	relief	organizations.	In	October	1995,	around	a	hundred	migrants	attempted	to	draw	attention	to	the	appalling	conditions	in	which	they	lived	by	blocking	streets	and	throwing	stones	at	passing	traffic.	The	police	and	civilian	population	were	quick	to	respond,	and	many	of	the	immigrants	were	forced	to	jump	into	the	ocean	to	avoid	being	lynched	by	enraged	mobs	hurling	racial	epithets.	The	mayor	of	Ceuta,	Basilio	Fernández,	defended	the	actions	of	the	civilian	population	as	“legitimate	self-defense”	and	subsequently	called	for	authorities	to	deport	all	illegal	immigrants	from	the	city	(Carr,	1997,	p.	65-66).		 Beyond	the	issues	of	migration,	Ceuta	and	Melilla	must	grapple	with	a	heightened	risk	of	terrorist	activity.	As	of	Spring	2015,	it	is	estimated	that	Ceuta	and	Melilla	have	contributed	more	recruits	to	ISIS	per	capita	than	any	other	town	in	Europe	(Frayer,	2015).	As	Ceuta	is	plagued	by	steep	unemployment	(over	30%	officially	as	of	May	2015),	the	threat	is	heightened,	especially	as	the	Arabic-speaking	half	of	the	population	is	disproportionately	poorer	(ibid).	The	security	forces	of	the	cities	remain	on	high	alert,	and	occasionally	do	make	arrests	of	individuals	suspected	of	ties	to	the	terrorist	organization	(El	País,	2017).			 Integration	between	ceutíes	of	European	origin	and	North	African	origin	is	severely	limited.	According	to	Felix	Arteaga,	a	researcher	at	Spain’s	Elcano	Royal	think	tank,	“There	are	very	few	mixed	marriages.	Integration	isn’t	working	at	all.	And	the	Muslim	birth	rate	is	double	or	triple	the	Spanish	average…	That’s	becoming	a	problem	for	public	services,	
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housing,	water,	electricity	and	schools”	(Frayer,	2015).	Indeed,	Spain	spends	more	money	on	welfare	per	capita	in	the	two	enclaves	than	in	any	other	Spanish	cities	(ibid).	
Conclusion		 For	two	cities	composing	fewer	than	200,000	inhabitants	and	occupying	less	than	15	square	miles	combined,	there	is	quite	a	lot	worthy	of	study	and	discussion.	The	twinned	cities	are	steeped	in	rich	history,	with	power	shifting	between	regional	rivals	over	thousands	of	years.	With	the	cities	currently	under	Spanish	control,	a	fascinating	border	dynamic	has	emerged	with	the	only	land	border	between	the	European	Union	and	the	African	continent.	The	multicultural	society	within	each	city	is	plagued	by	myriad	problems,	ranging	from	issues	related	to	immigration,	terrorism,	and	trade	with	Morocco,	whose	effects	penetrate	deep	into	Moroccan	society.	This	mélange	of	conflicts	and	quandaries	sets	the	stage	for	the	research	presented	herein,	looking	at	personal	accounts	of	smuggling	in	Morocco	and	Spanish	perceptions	of	their	cities	to	better	understand	some	of	the	dynamics	inherent	in	this	form	of	commerce,	what	smuggling	might	mean	to	the	informal	economies	in	Morocco	and	Spain,	and	how	it	contributes	more	broadly	to	issues	of	national	identity.		
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Methodology		
Introduction		 In	an	attempt	to	answer	the	questions	posed	in	this	paper’s	introduction,	my	research	employed	a	mixed	method	approach	involving	participant	observation	paired	with	a	series	of	in-depth	interviews	as	well	as	casual	conversations	with	Moroccans.	This	project	took	me	around	Northern	Morocco	and	into	Spain,	where	it	was	primarily	conducted	in	five	distinct	settings:	Ceuta,	Melilla,	the	border	crossings	for	each	city,	and	in	Zaio	–	a	small	city	near	Nador	on	the	Moroccan	side	of	the	border.		
Observation	and	Discovery		 The	first	week	of	my	research	was	conducted	on	site	in	Ceuta.	In	an	attempt	to	understand	the	culture	of	the	city,	I	first	visited	a	number	of	historic	locations	in	the	town	including	the	Fortaleza	de	Hacho	(Hacho	Fort),	the	Arab	Baths,	and	the	Royal	Walls.	These	visits,	coupled	with	tours	of	the	Museo	de	Ceuta	(Ceuta	Museum)	and	the	Museo	Histórico	
Militar	del	Desnarigado	(Desnarigado	Military	History	Museum)	supplemented	my	firsthand	knowledge	of	the	city.		 In	addition	to	studying	the	official	histories	presented	in	these	locations,	I	spent	much	of	my	time	in	Ceuta	observing	how	people	interacted	in	public.	Specifically,	I	listened	carefully	to	the	languages	people	used,	whether	they	spoke	in	just	Spanish	or	Arabic	or	both.	Did	people	I	perceived	to	be	of	North	African	origin	(based	on	their	usage	of	Darija	and	style	of	dress)	interact	with	people	I	perceived	to	be	of	Iberian	origin,	and	if	so,	in	what	ways?			 Lastly,	on	my	observation	days	I	spent	time	looking	for	indicators	of	the	multicultural	identity	of	the	city.	I	looked	for	any	signs	of	North	African	identity,	in	the	
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overwhelmingly	Spanish	city.	This	included	looking	at	(and	photographically	documenting)	signage,	graffiti,	and	street	art,	as	well	as	seeking	out	centers	of	Muslim	culture	like	mosques.	Though	my	time	in	Melilla	was	limited	to	just	one	day	due	to	time	and	budgetary	constraints,	I	employed	a	similar	methodology	in	getting	to	know	the	other	enclave.		 Time	spent	crossing	the	borders	was	not	squandered.	While	entering	and	exiting	Spain,	I	paid	special	attention	to	the	other	people	coming	and	going.	I	lingered	for	as	long	as	I	could	without	raising	suspicion	from	the	border	authorities,	and	in	both	cities	I	spent	time	observing	the	people	just	beyond	the	crossing.	I	had	hoped	to	establish	contact	with	smugglers	in	this	setting,	though	it	was	very	apparent	while	there	that	it	would	be	difficult	to	do	so	without	raising	the	suspicions	of	the	many	security	officers	watching.			 Back	on	the	Moroccan	side	of	the	border,	in	Zaio,	observation	took	place	primarily	in	grocery	stores.	To	see	the	true	extent	of	smuggling,	it	was	critical	to	see	where	a	large	percentage	of	smuggled	goods	end	up	before	disappearing	into	people’s	private	homes,	and	since	a	significant	amount	of	the	goods	appeared	to	be	food	or	toiletries	sold	in	groceries,	this	seemed	a	logical	site	in	which	to	conduct	research.		
Interviews	and	Casual	Conversation		 Interviewing	and	casual	conversation	proved	to	be	the	most	challenging	part	of	this	research.	Despite	being	armed	with	intermediate	Modern	Standard	Arabic	and	fairly	strong	Spanish,	communication	proved	rather	difficult.	With	more	patient	speakers	of	Spanish,	however,	I	was	able	to	conduct	7	formal	interviews	in	Ceuta	as	well	as	countless	casual	conversations	around	the	north	of	Morocco	and	the	enclaves.	The	purpose	of	these	interviews	and	conversations	was	to	glean	background	information	and	uncover	the	feelings	of	individuals	about	a	wide	range	of	topics,	ranging	from	the	sovereignty	question	
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to	smuggling	to	their	personal	relationship	with	Morocco.	(See	appendix	section	for	a	complete	list	of	questions).		 In	Morocco,	I	hoped	to	have	a	chance	to	interview	at	least	one	smuggler.	With	the	help	of	a	friend	from	the	area,	I	was	able	to	establish	four	possible	smuggler	contacts,	though	three	of	them	refused	to	answer	questions.	The	smuggler	who	did	agree	to	answer	questions,	however,	was	not	willing	to	meet	with	me	personally,	so	the	interview	was	conducted	through	a	mutually	trusted	third-party.	I	supplied	all	of	the	questions	for	the	interviewer,	who	was	gracious	enough	to	take	diligent	notes,	which	made	this	research	possible.	Through	the	same	friend,	I	was	also	able	to	establish	contact	with	a	grocer	in	a	Moroccan	border	town.	
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Findings	
In	Search	of	a	Smuggler		 Though	I	was	only	able	to	establish	solid	contact	with	one	active	smuggler,	the	results	are	no	less	fascinating.	This	individual,	who	I	will	refer	to	as	Youssef,	bravely	provided	me	with	a	tremendous	amount	of	detail	about	his	routine	and	daily	life,	which	I	will	retell	as	faithfully	as	possible.	Youssef’s	story,	I’m	told,	fits	in	well	with	the	greater	narrative	of	Moroccan	male	smugglers,	but	I	will	make	note	of	details	that	make	him	an	exceptional	case.	It	also	needs	to	be	said	that	within	this	case	study,	I	cannot	know	for	sure	the	extent	to	which	Youssef’s	story	is	similar	to	that	of	other	smugglers’.	
Life	of	Youssef		 Youssef	has	worked	as	a	smuggler	for	between	3-5	years.	The	focus	of	his	work	is	on	smuggling	small	comestibles	and	household	products,	unlike	other	smugglers	who	focus	on	more	expensive	items	like	clothing	(or	in	some	rarer	cases,	narcotics).		 Most	of	the	time,	he	works	four	days	a	week,	from	Monday	through	Thursday.	His	day	begins	quite	early,	leaving	home	around	4:30	AM	and	the	days	run	long	with	him	often	not	returning	to	Zaio	until	7:30	or	8:00	PM.	Working	a	15-hour	day	or	longer,	one	might	be	surprised	to	learn	that	Youssef	only	spends	one	hour	each	day	in	Melilla;	it	takes	him	4	hours	waiting	in	line	to	cross	the	border	with	his	car,	so	most	of	the	day	is	spent	waiting	around.			 Like	many	other	smugglers,	Youssef	works	as	an	informal	supplier	for	four	or	five	groceries.	Youssef’s	clientele	are	scattered	around	various	towns	near	the	Spanish	border.	This	is	the	common	practice	among	his	peers,	because	the	price	of	goods	becomes	less	competitive	if	they	have	to	be	transported	to	larger	urban	centers,	like	Oujda,	which	are	far	
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from	their	source.	In	this	line	of	work,	smugglers	will	pay	visit	to	their	stable	network	of	clients	at	night,	and	be	given	a	list	of	goods	that	the	grocers	need	purchased	the	next	day.	Youssef	is	paid	by	his	clients	after	certain	goods	are	solid	in	the	grocery	store.	On	occasion,	smugglers	like	Youssef	will	return	from	Melilla	with	goods	that	were	not	on	any	client’s	list.	When	this	happens,	smugglers	ask	around	to	see	if	any	groceries	need	their	goods,	and	if	not,	they	offer	them	to	their	regular	clients,	with	an	agreement	that	they	will	receive	payment	if	the	product	is	sold.	Using	this	method,	smugglers	also	navigate	any	potential	conflicts	with	grocers	who	refuse	goods	that	are	brought	to	them.		
	 Unlike	many	smugglers,	Youssef	is	unique	in	having	his	own	car	to	aid	in	his	work.	Smugglers	with	cars,	I’m	told,	typically	remain	in	this	line	of	work	longer,	though	it	comes	with	certain	added	difficulties.	The	majority	of	smugglers	do	not	own	cars,	so	they	either	carry	their	goods	on	their	backs,	or	they	carpool	and	cooperate	with	other	smugglers.	To	aid	in	this	process,	there	are	also	smugglers	whose	job	is	strictly	focused	on	the	transportation	of	goods	to	the	border	crossing	where	they	are	then	taken	to	Morocco	by	other	smugglers.	For	the	car-less	variety	of	smuggler,	everything	is	smaller.	They	pay	less	in	bribes	to	authorities,	bring	back	smaller	amounts	of	goods,	and	earn	less	money.	They	do,	however,	have	the	ability	to	make	2-3	trips	daily,	unlike	their	automobiled	counterparts	who	can	only	make	the	trek	once	a	day	(though	it	should	be	noted	that	in	the	past,	when	transnational	smuggling	was	in	a	more	inchoate	stage,	smugglers	with	cars	could	make	3-4	trips	a	day	and	earn	a	lot	of	money).			 For	those	smugglers	fortunate	enough	to	have	their	own	cars,	Youssef	informs	me,	a	bribe	must	be	paid	to	police	on	the	Moroccan	side	of	the	border	twice	daily.	Bribes	are	variable	in	cost	depending	on	the	type	of	good	being	transported.	For	his	particular	set	of	
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goods,	including	food,	toothpaste,	chocolate,	and	soap,	among	other	items,	Youssef	pays	bribes	of	50	dirham	(roughly	5	USD)	at	each	of	the	two	checkpoints.	If	smugglers	like	Youssef	do	not	pay	their	dues	to	police,	the	potential	repercussions	are	serious,	as	they	may	be	stopped	and	have	their	goods	seized	the	next	time	they	try	to	pass	through	(arrests	are	typically	only	made	if	they	are	smuggling	alcohol	or	other	drugs).	With	an	established	set	of	clients	and	the	cooperation	of	his	police	contacts,	Youssef	is	able	to	turn	a	profit	of	roughly	200	dirham	($20)	per	day.		 Another	distinction	that	sets	apart	Youssef	from	his	peers	is	his	level	of	education.	While	most	smugglers	have	a	high	school	education	or	less,	Youssef	managed	to	obtain	a	bachelor’s	degree	in	law.	He	felt	his	country	had	failed	him,	having	wasting	his	time	and	effort	when	he	was	unable	to	secure	a	job	after	graduation.	As	a	smuggler,	he	feels,	he	has	taken	charge	of	his	own	life	and	is	proud	to	be	getting	by	without	the	assistance	of	the	government.		 When	asked	about	the	issue	of	sovereignty	over	the	enclaves,	Youssef	expressed	indifference	towards	the	matter.	He	felt	like	his	home	country	had	let	him	down,	and	that	he	didn’t	care	what	happened	because	he	knows	he	is	exploited	by	both	Morocco	and	Spain.	Youssef,	along	with	many	thousands	of	other	smugglers,	contribute	to	the	Spanish	economy,	but	receive	no	help	along	the	way.	The	only	“support”	he	receives	is	the	relative	indifference	from	Spanish	authorities.	It	is	unclear	if	Youssef	has	any	legal	job	prospects	for	the	future,	but	for	now,	at	least,	Youssef	knows	what	he	has	to	do	to	take	care	of	himself.	
At	the	Grocery		 I	was	also	fortunate	enough	to	ask	questions	to	a	grocer	who	works	with	smugglers	like	Youssef.	Hicham,	as	I	will	call	him,	operates	a	modest	independent	grocery	store	in	
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Zaio,	a	small	city	around	an	hour	by	car	from	the	Melilla	border.	Hicham’s	grocery	sells	a	wide	variety	of	comestibles,	with	products	produced	both	in	Spain	and	in	Morocco.	Interestingly,	Hicham	notes	that	sometimes	his	clients	will	ask	him	if	he	has	any	other	brands	of	a	product	when	they	notice	the	one	they	picked	out	was	made	in	Morocco.	He	usually	does,	and	reports	that	his	clients	are	pleased	when	he	informs	them	that	he	also	has	a	version	of	the	same	product	produced	in	Spain.	“Made	in	Spain”	is	something	of	a	magic	phrase	for	Hicham.	Clients	are	most	often	intrigued	by	the	Spanish	alternative,	and	are	usually	willing	to	pay	a	little	bit	extra	for	the	Spanish	version	of	the	same	product.		 When	asked	about	why	this	preference	for	Spanish	goods	exists,	Hicham	stated	he	believed	it	had	to	do	with	quality	standards.	There	is	a	general	consensus	among	his	customers	that	goods	from	Spain	can	be	presumed	to	be	of	a	high	quality,	based	on	the	assumption	that	they	conform	to	EU	regulations	of	health	and	safety.		 As	noted	earlier,	all	sorts	of	goods	are	brought	back	from	Spain	to	be	sold	in	Morocco,	but	Hicham’s	primary	Spanish	goods	are	food	items.	Shopkeepers	do	sell	the	whole	gamut	of	Spanish	merchandise,	but	have	a	tendency	to	tailor	their	selection	to	a	particular	type	of	business.	Even	selling	just	food	and	other	household	products,	Hicham	estimates	that	up	to	40%	of	the	goods	in	his	store	are	Spanish	in	origin.		 In	order	to	keep	his	business	operating	smoothly,	with	a	constant	flow	of	Spanish	imports,	Hicham	employs	two	permanent	smugglers.	His	“employees”	trek	back	and	forth	from	Melilla	daily	to	acquire	a	predetermined	list	of	goods,	in	the	same	way	that	Youssef	does	for	his	grocer-contractor.	Many	grocers,	notes	Hicham,	employ	several	smugglers	to	keep	their	shelves	stocked,	but	there	is	always	one	primary	smuggler	who	acquires	the	bulk	of	the	goods	needed	by	the	grocery	on	any	given	day.	Even	with	the	failsafe	of	
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employing	multiple	smugglers,	however,	grocers	still	run	into	problems	with	their	runners.	Sometimes	smugglers	are	unable	to	acquire	certain	goods	on	their	lists,	causing	periodic	outages	of	certain	products.	Other	times,	there	is	discord	between	smugglers	and	their	contractors	as	to	how	much	a	product	should	be	sold	for,	as	grocers	will	complain	that	other	smugglers	charge	less	for	the	same	product.		 Relying	on	smugglers	to	obtain	up	to	40%	of	his	wares	introduces	a	fair	amount	of	uncertainty	in	the	day-to-day	operations	of	Hicham’s	business.	Asked	about	the	question	of	Melilla’s	sovereignty,	Hicham	was	hesitant	to	give	an	answer.	Clearly,	he	understood	the	potential	repercussions	if	Melilla	were	to	join	Morocco	and	the	flow	of	Spanish	goods	to	Zaio	would	at	very	least	be	interrupted.	After	some	hesitation,	however,	Hicham	responded	that	the	enclaves	“are	parts	of	Morocco,	of	course.”					Across	the	Border:	Impressions	of	Spaniards	in	border	territories	
	 While	Youssef,	and	thousands	of	others	like	him,	struggle	to	get	by	through	smuggling,	the	Spanish	look	on	from	their	clean,	orderly,	and	well-developed	enclaves.	The	cities	obviously	have	a	strong	economic	relationship	with	Morocco,	but	does	the	relationship	extend	beyond	the	informal	trade?	I	spoke	with	a	number	of	Spanish	residents	of	Ceuta	to	inquire	about	the	dimensions	of	the	Moroccan-Spanish	relationship.	
Perceptions	of	Smuggling	and	Migration	At	Ceuta’s	city	tourism	office,	I	spoke	with	an	employee,	herein	referred	to	as	María.	Originally	from	peninsular	Spain,	María	has	lived	in	Ceuta	for	nearly	two	decades.	With	her	extensive	knowledge	of	the	city	and	its	history,	I	was	able	to	glean	some	important	information.	In	trying	to	broach	the	polemical	subject	of	smuggling	with	her,	we	spoke	about	the	problems	facing	Ceuta.	She	was	eager	from	the	outset,	it	seemed,	to	downplay	the	
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myriad	problems	of	migration,	smuggling,	and	terrorism	addressed	elsewhere	in	this	paper.	The	biggest	problems,	according	to	her,	were	the	cost	associated	with	visiting	the	enclave,	as	well	as	the	difficulties	in	reaching	it	when	the	weather	is	poor.	When	bluntly	asked	about	the	issues	of	smuggling	and	migration,	however,	María	opened	up.	She	understood	smuggling	to	be	an	important	activity	at	the	border,	but	described	the	conditions	that	smugglers	work	in	as	“inhumano”	(inhumane).	Seeing	these	people	carry	twice	their	body	weight	on	their	backs	made	her	sad,	though	it	does	not	seem	to	her	like	the	Spanish	government	cares	to	curtail	this	practice	beyond	current	regulations	(she	believed	that	the	officials	only	do	not	permit	smugglers	to	carry	back	bags	that	touch	the	ground).	Asked	about	why	migrants	seek	to	enter	to	Ceuta,	María	suggested	that	they	come	to	Spain	seeking	somewhere	“más	civilizado	y	desarollado”	(more	civilized	and	developed).		 I	also	spoke	with	Carlos,	a	man	in	his	50’s,	who	operates	a	souvenir	shop	in	Ceuta.	Discussing	the	problems	facing	the	city,	Carlos	was	quick	to	note	the	major	issues	the	enclave	faces	with	unemployment,	which	as	noted	earlier,	sits	at	a	staggering	30%.	With	unemployment	figures	so	high,	Carlos	felt	that	Moroccans	were	in	part	to	blame,	as	he	believes	that	many	Moroccans	work	illegally	in	the	city	as	day	laborers	on	construction	sites,	as	waiters	in	restaurants,	and	as	housecleaners.	The	Spanish,	for	their	part,	do	not	do	much	on	the	other	side	of	the	border.	Mostly,	he	thought,	Spaniards	crossed	the	border	to	buy	cheaper	produce	and	occasionally	to	rent	houses	on	the	beach	during	vacations.		 Despite	his	reservations	about	Moroccans	coming	into	Ceuta,	however,	he	personally	benefited	from	the	existence	of	the	smuggling	industry.	In	his	souvenir	shop,	Carlos	sold	a	wide	variety	of	keepsakes,	but	the	most	eye-catching	items	for	sale	were	of	Moroccan	origin.	Just	beyond	the	doorway	of	his	shop,	Carlos	advertised	the	many	
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Moroccan	goods	for	sale,	including	multicolored	Moroccan	slippers,	hamsa	necklaces,	and	beautiful	kaftans	(a	type	of	traditional	Moroccan	dress).	The	dresses,	Carlos	informed	me,	he	purchased	in	bulk	from	a	Moroccan	smuggler	who	brought	them	into	the	city,	which	he	then	resells	to	visitors	for	a	small	profit.	
	Pictured:	Moroccan	style	kaftans	for	sale	outside	of	Carlos’	shop.		
Perceptions	of	Multiculturalism	 	Asked	about	the	North	African	culture	of	the	city	María	informed	me	that	Ceuta	does	indeed	serve	as	a	metaphorical	bridge	between	cultures,	reflected	in	the	city’s	Andalusian	culture	and	cuisine.	Despite	her	insistence	that	the	city	embraced	its	multiculturalism,	some	other	statements	and	facts	seemed	to	contradict	this.	For	example,	María	is	one	of	nine	employees	at	the	tourism	office,	yet	only	one	of	her	colleagues	spoke	any	Arabic	at	all.	Others	were	less	certain	that	the	city	had	any	sort	of	multicultural	identity.	One	interviewee	remarked	that,	with	regards	to	the	Muslim	inhabitants	of	the	city,	“somos	
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hermanos,	pero	ellos	tienen	su	propia	lengua	y	cultura”	(we	are	brothers,	but	they	have	their	own	language	and	culture).	Also	revealing,	this	interviewee	added	that	if	I	wanted	to	talk	with	some	Muslim	residents	of	Ceuta,	he	could	direct	me	to	a	neighborhood	where	they	live,	suggesting	the	ethnic	segregation	of	the	city.	In	a	different	encounter,	one	interviewee	suggested	that	any	notion	of	multiculturalism	in	the	city	was	a	sham,	though	rather	ironically,	he	occasionally	inserted	Arabic	words	into	his	speech.		I	also	spoke	with	Juan,	who	is	an	employee	in	the	Museo	de	Ceuta	(Ceuta	Museum),	which	is	housed	in	a	pavilion	of	the	city’s	old	barracks	constructed	by	the	Corps	of	Military	Engineers.	Offering	exhibitions	on	the	enclave’s	ancient,	medieval,	and	modern	history,	the	museum	is	one	of	the	most	important	cultural	hubs	of	the	city.	Juan	is	a	lifelong	resident	of	Ceuta,	and	his	family	has	lived	in	the	city	for	over	a	century.	Citing	his	lifetime	of	experience	and	career	in	the	museum,	he	confidently	stated	that	“la	vida	cotidiana	de	la	ciudad	es	como	
cualquier	ciudad	Europea…	No	parece	que	sea	África	ni	Árabe”	(the	daily	life	of	the	city	is	like	any	European	city…	it	doesn’t	seem	African	or	Arab).	
Thoughts	about	National	Identity		 On	the	issue	of	sovereignty,	María	was	adamant	that	Ceuta	was	an	integral	part	of	the	Spanish	state	and	could	never	be	ceded	to	Morocco.	“Una	cosa	que	nunca	ha	sido	tuya	no	
se	puede	devolver.”	(Something	that	has	never	been	yours	cannot	be	returned.)	She	also	compared	Spain’s	control	of	Ceuta	to	the	existence	of	countries	like	Monaco	and	Lichtenstein:	countries	whose	independence	is	not	geographically	logical	but	persist	because	of	their	unique	histories,	cultures,	and	identities.	While	he	did	believe	the	culture	and	the	daily	life	of	the	city	to	be	very	European,	Juan	acknowledged	that	the	city	faces	legitimate	challenges	of	coexistence	between	people	of	North	African	origin	and	Iberian	
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origin,	not	unlike	the	sectarian	conflicts	in	the	United	States.	In	addition	to	this	problem,	Juan	was	gravely	concerned	about	immigration	issues.	Spain,	he	noted,	“es	un	país	que	no	puede	admitir	inmigrantes	porque	España	no	está	preparada	económicamente	para	aguantar	esta	presión…	España	no	está	preparada	para	recibir…”	(is	a	country	that	cannot	admit	immigrants	because	it	is	not	economically	prepared	to	endure	that	pressure…	Spain	is	not	ready	to	receive…).	
Observations		 Walking	around	Ceuta	and	Melilla,	it	was	quite	difficult	to	get	a	sense	of	a	genuine	multicultural	identity,	from	the	perspective	of	an	outsider.	Official	signage	around	the	cities	–	in	museums,	on	street	signs,	and	in	public	advertising	–	rarely	appears	in	languages	other	than	Spanish,	and	when	it	does,	the	alternative	is	almost	never	in	Arabic.	Public	spaces	that	should	suggest	a	multicultural	identity,	like	the	Arab	baths	in	Ceuta,	do	indeed	exist,	though	they	are	not	prominent	attractions	of	the	cities	(when	I	visited	the	Arab	baths	at	midday,	I	was	the	only	person	there).	On	the	streets,	people	in	European	dress	with	physical	traits	associated	with	European	heritage	talked	among	themselves	in	Spanish.	Others,	dressed	in	a	more	conservative,	North	African	style	with	North	African	traits	usually	spoke	in	North	African	tongues	(Darija	in	Ceuta,	Tarafit	in	Melilla)	and	only	rarely	switched	over	to	Spanish,	at	least	as	far	I	was	able	to	observe.		 In	most	public	places,	Ceuta	and	Melilla	do	not	appear	any	different	from	the	archetypal	Spanish	city.	One	of	the	most	prominent	distinctions,	however,	is	the	existence	of	graffiti	in	Arabic,	abundantly	found	in	Ceuta.	Graffiti,	which	some	researchers	have	explored	as	an	alternative	art	form,	is	often	used	to	express	social	and	political	messages	
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outside	of	mainstream	venues.	It	is	therefore	of	interest	to	not	the	presence	of	graffiti	in	border	cities	like	Ceuta	and	Melilla.	
	Pictured:	Arabic	graffiti	in	Ceuta.	The	artist	began	by	writing	the	Arabic	word	for	“Spain,”	though	most	of	the	work	has	been	destroyed	and	painted	over.			 In	a	tunnel	outside	of	a	prominent	church	in	Ceuta,	I	found	the	word	“Spain”	painted	on	the	wall	in	Arabic.	There	was	clearly	more	written	beyond	this	simple	word,	though	somebody	else	had	noticed	this,	and	painted	over	the	rest	of	the	phrase	and	rendered	it	inscrutable.		
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Discussion		 Clearly,	there	is	no	consensus	among	Spanish	residents	of	Ceuta	about	the	identity	of	their	city.	For	some,	Ceuta	is	a	veritable	melting	pot	of	Andalusian	culture.	For	other,	any	notions	of	a	multicultural	identity	are	wreathed	in	issues	of	segregation	and	fears	tied	to	African	migration.	It	is	hard	to	say	for	certain,	from	the	perspective	of	Spanish	ceutíes,	whether	their	relationship	with	Morocco	and	Moroccans	is	anything	more	than	strictly	economic.	In	wandering	the	cities’	streets	and	museums,	it	does	seem	as	though	Spanish	culture	is	predominant	in	both	places.	Without	official	signage	in	Arabic,	and	with	the	shrouding	of	monuments	to	the	cities’	North	African	heritage,	like	the	Arab	baths,	it	is	hard	from	an	outsider’s	perspective	to	see	anything	other	than	the	supremacy	of	Spanish	culture	and	relegation	of	other	cultures	to	the	periphery.	I	cannot	say	for	certain	what	the	significance	is,	but	it	is	important	to	note	the	way	that	Spanish	has	officially	(through	language	designation	and	signage)	and	unofficially	(through	erasure	of	graffiti	in	Arabic)	asserted	itself	as	the	dominant	cultural	force	in	the	two	enclaves,	despite	the	considerable	percentage	in	each	enclave	of	people	of	non-Iberian	origin.			 Across	the	borders,	in	Northern	Morocco,	there	is	not	a	sizeable	permanent	population	of	Spaniards.	But	clearly,	there	is	some	desire	to	appear	as	though	there	is	a	real	link	with	Spain	(as	well	as	the	rest	of	Europe	and	the	West)	proven	by	the	simple	existence	of	the	smuggling	economy.	Certain	goods,	especially	technology,	can	be	hard	to	acquire	in	Morocco,	but	comestibles	and	other	household	products	can	be	found	with	ease,	yet	the	bulk	of	Moroccan	smuggling	concerns	these	items.	Without	a	doubt,	competitive	pricing	on	duty-free	smuggled	goods	is	a	factor	in	explaining	the	popularity	of	Spanish	goods,	but	that	does	not	tell	the	full	story.	In	every	conversation	I	had	in	Zaio	about	Spanish	imports,	the	
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same	simple	belief	kept	popping	up	in	conversation:	“if	it	comes	from	Spain,	it	is	higher	quality.”			 What	does	this	reveal	about	Moroccans	in	the	country’s	north?	Perhaps	there	is	a	certain	status	attained	when	one	can	fill	their	homes	with	Western	products.	Resulting	from	decades	of	colonialism	and	subsequent	central	neglect	under	Hassan	II,	Northern	Morocco	lags	considerably	in	terms	of	development	when	compared	to	Rabat	and	other	major	cities	further	south.	Smuggling	not	only	provides	the	north	with	the	goods	it	needs,	but	perhaps	it	allows	the	people	of	the	north	to	feel	empowered	and	have	a	(sometimes	literal)	taste	of	the	“good	life.”		 Anthropologists	theorize	that	sometimes	consumer	goods	have	meaning	beyond	economic	exchange.	For	example,	the	Marcel	Mauss	believed	that	“value”	is	essentially	a	social	construct;	goods	that	are	bought,	traded,	or	given	need	to	be	examined	within	the	context	of	the	cultures	or	subcultures	in	which	they	exchanged	to	truly	understand	their	real	and	symbolic	value	(Mauss,	1922).	In	the	context	of	smuggling	goods	from	border	cities	into	Morocco,	it	would	be	critical	to	conduct	further	in-depth	research	to	form	better	understanding	of	why	it	is	that	Moroccans	wish	to	purchase	Spanish	goods	and	what	they	mean	to	them.		 While	some	of	the	goods	smuggled	into	Morocco	allow	citizens	to	live	their	lives	like	their	European	neighbors,	it	is	important	to	note	that	this	dynamic	is	exploited	by	a	number	of	companies.	Moroccans	want	to	purchase	“higher	quality”	goods	from	Spain,	but	sometimes	the	goods	they	import	are	not	even	consumed	by	Spaniards.	One	prime	example	of	this	is	the	line	of	cacao	products	produced	by	Borras	S.L.	in	Ceuta.	A	popular	treat	found	all	over	Morocco,	their	Maruja	bars	are	not	commonly	found	in	Spain,	and	their	website	
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even	notes	their	strong	presence	in	Northern	Africa,	especially	in	Morocco	and	Algeria	(Maruja,	2017).	Equating	a	product’s	European	origin	with	higher	quality	is	a	dangerous	assumption,	as	Maruja	has	not	officially	been	marketed	as	“chocolate”	since	1952.	In	that	year,	the	company	decided	on	a	“strategic	change,”	and	switched	their	production	from	chocolate	to	a	chocolate	sucedáneo	(substitute),	whose	primary	selling	point	appears	to	be	that	the	product	is	less	susceptible	to	melting	under	heat	(ibid).			 Even	goods	produced	in	Morocco	will	sometimes	try	to	pretend	to	be	European	in	origin.	In	supermarkets	all	across	the	country,	one	can	easily	find	a	popular	brand	of	juice	sold	under	the	label	of	“Valencia.”		Produced	in	Meknès,	it	is	unclear	what,	if	any,	tie	the	brand	has	to	the	city	on	the	east	coast	of	Spain,	but	this	serves	to	further	the	notion	that	there	is	some	sort	of	value	ascribed	to	products	associated	with	the	West.		 The	smuggling	trade	into	Morocco	clearly	plays	an	important	role	in	the	country’s	national	economy.	What	the	goods	themselves	mean,	however,	is	more	ambiguous.	Looking	at	which	products	are	brought	into	Morocco,	and	what	value	Moroccans	ascribe	to	them,	could	help	uncover	more	about	the	complicated	ways	in	which	people	in	this	region	of	the	world	define	themselves	and	live	in	multicultural	societies.	By	attempting	to	understand	the	underground	economy,	one	can	better	understand	the	relationship	between	different	but	interrelated	cultures.		
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Limitations		 After	discussing	the	findings	of	this	research,	it	is	important	to	acknowledge	the	basic	limitations	of	this	study.	The	data	presented	herein	was	collected	over	the	course	of	just	one	month,	and	further	research	is	required	to	draw	larger	conclusions.	While	I	faced	many	challenges	in	undertaking	this	project,	there	are	four	main	limitations,	which	absolutely	must	be	addressed.	First,	the	sample	I	have	drawn	from	is	small	and	the	data	presented	in	this	study	may	not	be	indicative	of	the	various	populations	I	describe.	With	more	time	and	resources,	I	would	have	tried	to	obtain	a	larger	sample	to	draw	from.		Second,	there	was	a	considerable	language	barrier	to	my	research.	Though	I	speak	fairly	advanced	Spanish	and	intermediate	Arabic,	there	were	moments	in	nearly	every	interview	where	I	would	either	not	understand	what	was	said	to	me,	or	I	would	be	unable	to	ask	certain	follow-up	questions.		Additionally,	it	is	important	to	consider	that	on	several	occasions,	I	was	not	present	for	the	interviews	I	describe.	Direct	quotation	is	mostly	impossible,	and	the	nature	of	these	interviews	force	me	to	trust	the	accuracy	of	another	individual’s	notes	and	memory.	Related	to	this	point,	researching	sensitive	topics	is	difficult,	and	it	was	critical	for	the	sake	of	this	project	that	I	made	any	concessions	asked	of	me	by	people	engaged	in	sub-rosa	activity	of	questionable	legality	to	ensure	their	comfort	as	well	as	the	candor	of	their	responses.	It	would	have	been	helpful	to	interview	these	people	myself,	but	establishing	these	types	of	trusting	relationships	take	time,	which	unfortunately	I	did	not	have	much	of.		Finally,	as	with	any	research	that	partially	utilizes	a	participant/observer	methodology,	my	data	is	subject	to	my	own	inherent	biases.	Even	the	photographs	I	took	literally	are	through	my	own	lenses:		just	as	I	selected	certain	things	to	capture	visually	and	
	 40	
framed	the	shots	as	I	did,	I	also	no	doubt	saw,	heard,	and	interpreted	interviews	within	the	context	of	my	own	background.	Given	the	significant	limitations	of	this	research	period,	I	am	cautious	to	generalize	from	the	data	I	have	collected.		
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Further	Research			 Given	the	scale	of	this	subject	matter,	and	the	myriad	dimensions	deserving	of	exploration,	further	research	is	undoubtedly	needed.	As	stated	earlier,	this	project	was	conducted	over	the	course	of	just	one	month	of	study,	and	I	was	not	able	to	obtain	as	many	interviews	as	I	would	have	liked.			 One	possible	direction	for	further	research	involves	returning	to	Ceuta	and	Melilla	to	conduct	more	interviews.	With	more	time,	I	(or	any	other	researcher	for	that	matter)	could	get	a	clearer	picture	of	the	internal	and	external	relationships	of	the	enclaves	by	interviewing	a	larger	number	of	Spanish	and	North	African	residents	of	the	cities,	as	well	as	potentially	incorporating	some	elite	interviews	from	Spanish	officials.		 At	the	borders	and	beyond,	it	would	also	be	beneficial	to	continue	interviewing.	Perhaps	future	scholarship	will	engage	with	police	officers	who	work	on	the	border	to	get	a	another	perspective	on	the	dynamics	described	in	this	study.	While	I	was	quite	fortunate	to	have	one	smuggler	who	was	willing	to	divulge	so	much	information	to	me,	it	would	be	great	for	future	research	to	also	include	the	thoughts	and	stories	of	more	smugglers,	both	male	and	female.	As	I	learned,	there	are	gender	differences	with	regard	to	the	type	of	goods	smuggled	and	the	methods	used	to	get	goods	across	the	borders.	Interviewing	more	grocers	in	the	towns	scattered	around	the	borders	could	also	yield	more	interesting	revelations,	and	interviews	with	their	customers	could	provide	greater	insight	into	why	Spanish	goods	are	so	desirable	and	what	they	mean	to	those	who	purchase	them	given	the	extraordinary	and	arduous	measures	required	to	bring	them	to	market.			 It	would	be	useful	for	future	researchers	to	delve	more	deeply	into	some	of	the	highly	nuanced	issues	on	which	I	scratched	the	surface.	For	example,	trying	to	understand	
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the	ways	in	which	language	use	and	code-switching,	or	the	formal	and	informal	use	(and	erasure)	of	Spanish/Arabic	in	these	border	cities,	could	be	highly	useful	in	trying	to	better	assess	the	meaning	of	the	informal	economy	and	identity.	Finally,	having	more	time	to	conduct	this	type	of	research	would	be	helpful	in	furthering	understanding	of	the	complex	nature	of	trade	and	what	it	means	in	both	economic	and	social	senses	on	both	sides	of	the	border.	One	of	the	most	important	things	I’ve	learned	from	doing	this	research	is	just	how	time-consuming	it	is	to	do	research	at	the	granular	level.		 	
	 43	
Appendices	
Appendix	A	–	Interview	Guidelines	for	Smugglers	
	
1.	Goods	A.	What	do	you	trade?	B.	Are	the	goods	you	trade	items	that	cannot	easily	be	acquired	in	Morocco?	 C.	If	not,	why	do	you	go	through	the	hassle	of	getting	___	in	Spain?	D.	Why	do	you	think	Moroccans	are	interested	in	goods	from	Spain?	E.	What	kinds	of	things	do	Moroccans	like	from	Spain?	 
2.	Background/	Daily	Life	A.	What	can	you	tell	me	about	your	daily	routine?		B.	How	often	do	you	work?	 C.	How	long	have	you	been	doing	this	for?	D.	Have	you	ever	done	another	job?	
3.	Organization	A.	How	is	your	work	organized?	B.	Do	you	alone	or	work	with	others?	C.	Do	different	people	specialize	in	different	types	of	goods?	D.	Do	other	members	of	your	family	also	trade?	 
4.	Other	A.	Have	you	ever	had	anyone	question	you	when	you	go	across	the	border?	If	so,	what	sort	of	concerns	do	they	have?	 
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B.	Do	you	think	Ceuta	and	Melilla	should	be	part	of	Spain	or	Morocco?	How	would	you	react	if	Spain	agreed	to	cede	control	of	the	cities	to	Morocco?					
Appendix	B	–	Interview	Guidelines	for	Ceuta/	Melilla	Residents	
1.	Background	A.	How	long	have	you	lived	here	for?	B.	What	languages	do	you	speak?	C.	Do	you	know	any	Arabic?	Is	it	useful?	Why?	 Do	you	have	family	here?	How	long	has	your	family	lived	here?	 
2.	Multiculturalism/	Trade	A.	In	many	ways,	Ceuta	serves	as	a	bridge	between	Africa,	the	Arab	World,	and	Europe.	How	does	that	influence	daily	life	in	the	city?	 B.	Have	you	ever	been	to	Morocco?	 C.	Do	you	ever	buy	goods	that	come	from	Morocco?	What	kinds?	Are	these	things	you	can’t	get	in	Ceuta?	 
3.	Politics	1.	The	Moroccan	government	as	well	as	the	Arab	League	have	called	for	Ceuta	and	the	other	
plazas	de	soberanía	to	be	returned	to	Morocco.	Is	this	something	you	agree	with?	 2.	Is	there	a	comparison	to	be	made	with	Spanish	claims	to	Gibraltar?	3.	Do	you	feel	that	the	Spanish	government	treats	Ceuta	as	a	full	part	of	Spain?	 
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4.	What	are	the	biggest	problems	facing	Ceuta?					
Appendix	C	–	Interview	Guidelines	for	Moroccan	Grocers	
	
A.	Products/	Smuggling	1.	Are	the	items	you	sell	ones	that	cannot	easily	be	acquired	in	Morocco?	2.	If	not,	why	do	you	go	through	the	hassle	of	getting	___	in	Spain?	 3.	Why	do	you	think	Moroccans	are	interested	in	goods	from	Spain?	4.	What	kinds	of	things	do	Moroccans	like	from	Spain?	 5.	Roughly	what	percent	of	your	goods	come	from	Spain?	6.	How	do	you	get	them?	(How	many	traders	do	you	employ	to	get	these	goods?	Are	there	ever	any	problems	with	them?)	7.	Do	you	think	your	customers	are	more	likely	to	buy	something	if	it	has	a	label	that's	in	Spanish?	Why	is	that?		8.	Are	you	aware	of	any	Moroccan	goods	that	get	sold	in	Spain?	What	kinds	of	things?	 
B.	Politics	A.	Do	you	think	Ceuta	and	Melilla	should	be	part	of	Spain	or	Morocco?	How	would	you	react	if	Spain	agreed	to	cede	control	of	the	cities	to	Morocco?	 
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